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CASE COMMENTS
ATTORNEY-GENERAL of CANADA v. LAVELL ISAAC et al. 
v. BEDARD
Challenging that which the murky waters of the future have 
in store by claiming the existence of a judicial trend is never a 
safe pursuit, and when the proof for such an assertion is based 
only upon two cases, the endeavour is more likely to be nothing 
short of foolhardiness. However, it is submitted that a good argu­
ment can be made for holding that whenever a clash between the 
Canadian Bill of Rights1 and the Indian Act1 reaches the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the resultant majority decision will be, to say 
the least, unpredictably unique in character.
The first case called upon to verify this assertion is R. v. 
Drybones3 where the Court held that s. 94(b) of the Indian Act4 
is rendered inoperative because that section of the Act denies to 
an Indian “equality before the law” as guaranteed by s. 1(b) of 
the Canadian Bill of Rights} The unique aspect of this decision 
is not its finding per se, but rather the combination of the follow­
ing two factors within the case: (1) the majority judgement, deliver­
ed by Ritchie J., was based upon the strong dissent of Cartwright J., 
as he then was, in Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen* and
1 R.S.C. 1970. App. III.
2 R.S.C. 1970. c. 1-6.
3 (1969). 3 D.L.R. (3d) 473. The respondent, an Indian, was charged for being 
intoxicated off a reserve pursuant to s. 94(b) o f the Indian A ct (infra, note 
4.). The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal for conviction  
and affirmed the decision of the lower court by holding that s.94(b) of the 
Indian A ct was rendered inoperative by s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill o f Rights 
(infra, note 5.) on the ground that s. 94(b) o f the Indian A ct created for Indians 
an offence which was not imposed upon the members of any other race.
4 R.S.C. 1952, c. 149 (now R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6). 
s. 94. (now s. 95.) An Indian who
(a) has intoxicants in his possession,
(b) is intoxicated, or
(c) makes or manufactures intoxicants off a reserve, is guilty o f an offence
and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than ten dol­
lars and not more than fifty dollars or to imprisonment for a term  
not exceeding three months or to both fine and imprisonment.
5 R.S.C. 1960, c. 44 (now R.S.C. 1970, App. III).
s. 1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed  
and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national 
origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, namely,
(b) the right o f the individual to equality before the law and the p r o  
tection of the law.
6 (1964), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 485.
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(2) Cartwright C.J., as he then was, in an equally strong dissent, 
repudiated his dissent in the Robertson and Rosetanni case. It 
is subm itted that there are few other, if any, cases from the 
Supreme Court of Canada wherein we find the Chief Justice de­
claring as erroneous in law one of his previous dissenting judg­
ments whilst the majority of his brothers on the bench are embrac­
ing that same dissenting judgment and using it as the basis of their 
decision.
The second and more recent case dealing with this same 
clash of federal legislation is Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell 
Isaac et al. v. Bedard1, a case involving two appeals, where the 
Court held that s 12(l)(b) of the Indian Act* is not rendered 
inoperative by s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.9 This decision 
contains aspects that are even more unique than those of its pre­
decessor, the Drybones case.10 Note, for example, the following 
elements of the Lavell-Bedardu decision: (1) the case, though deal­
ing with a problem that was similar in principle to the Drybones 
situation, yielded a contrary decision, yet the judgment in Dry­
bones was not criticized; (2) Ritchie J. delivered the majority 
judgment, and instead of basing it upon his majority judgment in 
the Drybones case, he distinguished that judgment and chose to 
rely upon the dissent of Pigeon J. in the Drybones case as the basis 
of his decision; and (3) the majority judgment hinged upon the 
argument that a relevant distinction of fact rendered the Drybones 
decision inapplicable to the Lavell-Bedard situation, but the major­
ity of the Court refused to hold that such a distinction existed.
One could fabricate a rational explanation regarding these
7 (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481. The respondents, Indian wom en, married non- 
Indians. As a result, their names were deleted from the Indian Register pur­
suant to s. 12(1 )(b) o f the Indian A ct (infra, footnote 8) and they lost their 
status as Indians. The women appealed to the Federal Court o f Appeal which 
held that s. 12(1 )(b) of the Indian A ct was rendered inoperative by s. 1(b) 
of the Canadian Bill o f  Rights (supra, footnote 5) on the ground that s. 12(1 )(b) 
of the Indian A ct imposed upon members o f the female sex disqualifications 
which were not imposed upon members of the male sex. The Supreme Court 
o f Canada, on appeal by the Crown, reversed this decision.
8 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 12( 1 )(b) which provides as follows:
12(1) The following persons are not entitled to be registered, namely,
(b) a woman who married a person who is not an Indian, unless that 
woman is subsequently the wife or widow of a person described in sec­
tion 11.
9 Supra, footnote 5.
10 Supra, footnote 3.
11 Supra, footnote 8.
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aspects of the Lavell-Bedard case if one were able to state that 
the case overruled, reversed, or in any way held the Drybones 
decision to be bad law, but such an assertion would be incorrect. 
In fact, quite the opposite is true, for the Court, paradoxically, 
appears to have unanimously affirmed the Drybones decision in 
the Lavell-Bedard cases. Abbott J., as he then was, held, in his 
dissent, that the Drybones case should be applied to the Lavell- 
Bedard cases. Laskin J., as he then was, (with Hall and Spence JJ. 
concurring) argued, in his dissent, that the Lavell-Bedard appeals:12
........................... involve consideration again of the principles governing
the application of the Canadian Bill o f Rights, R.S.C. 1970. App. Ill, 
as laid down by this Court in R. v. Drybones (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473,
[1970] 3 C.C.C. 355, [1970] S.C.R. 282. In my opinion, unless we are 
to depart from what was said in Drybones, both appeals now before us 
must be dismissed. I have no disposition to reject what was decided in 
Drybones; and on the central issue o f prohibited discrimination as 
catalogued in s. 1 o f the Canadian Bill o f Rights, it is, in my opinion  
impossible to distinguish Drybones from the two cases in appeal. If, 
as in Drybones, discrimination by reason of race makes certain statutory 
provisions inoperative, the same result must follow as to statutory pro­
visions which exhibit discrimination by reason of sex.
Ritchie J. (with Fauteux C.J., as he then was, and Martland and 
Judson JJ. concurring), in the majority judgment, denied that the 
Drybones decision was being questioned and, instead, avoided 
his decision in that case by attempting to distinguish Drybones 
from the Lavell-Bedard situation. Even Pigeon J., who dissented 
in Drybones, was unwilling to criticize the outcome of that case. 
He merely ignored the decision in Drybones and agreed with the 
decision of Ritchie J. on the ground that since that judge (and three 
other concurring judges) accepted his dissent in Drybones as 
the law in the Lavell-Bedard cases, it would not be improper for 
him to adhere to what he had said in that dissent.
Thus, one is not able to find, in the Lavell-Bedard cases, any 
criticism of the judgment in the Drybones case. However, what 
one does see (and this certainly does not add any weight to its 
decision) is the peculiar situation in which the majority of the 
Court in Lavell-Bedard are in disagreement with the reason for 
supporting the majority judgment in that case. Ritchie J. based the 
majority judgment on the ground that Drybones could be dis­
tinguished from the Lavell-Bedard cases on the following grounds: 
(1) Drybones was not concerned with the internal regulations of 
Indians on reserves, but (2) dealt exclusively with the creation 
of an offence (visited by punishment) off a reserve which applied
12 (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481. at pp. 501-502.
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only to Indians and not to others; and (3) that:13
the impunged section in the [Drybones] case could not be enforced  
without denying equality o f treatment in the administration and enforce­
ment of the law before the ordinary Courts of the land to a racial group, 
whereas no such inequality of treatment between Indian men and wom ­
en flows as a necessary result o f the application of s. 12(1) (b) of the 
Indian Act.
However, Abbott J., in his dissent, expressed his agreement with 
the dissent of Laskin J. (Hall and Spence JJ. concurring), who 
held that the Drybones case could not be distinguished on those 
or any other grounds. Also, Pigeon J., although he agreed with 
the judgment of Ritchie J., appears to have accepted Laskin J.’s 
argument that the two cases are not distinguishable from one an­
other. In fact, the judgment of Pigeon J. indicates that he consid­
ered repudiating his Drybones dissent in the Lavell-Bedard cases, 
as did Cartwright C.J. repudiate his Robertson and Rosetanni 
dissent in the Drybones case. Read the first paragraph of Pigeon 
J.’s judgment carefully. The only thing of which he appears to be 
certain is that the Canadian Bill of Rights was not meant to sup­
press the right of the federal government to legislate with respect 
to Indians:14
I agree in the result with Ritchie, J. I certainly cannot disagree with 
the view I did express in R. v. Drybones (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473 at 
pp. 489-90, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 355, [1970] C.S.R. 282, that the enactment 
of the Canadian Bill o f Rights was not intended to effect a virtual sup­
pression of federal legislation over Indians. My difficulty is Laskin, J.’s 
strongly reasoned opinion that, unless we are to depart from what was 
said by the majority in Drybones, these appeals should be dismissed 
because, if discrimination by reason of race makes certain statutory 
provisions inoperative, the same result must follow as to statutory pro­
visions which exhibit discrimination by reason of sex. In the end, it 
appears to me that, in the circumstances. I need not reach a firm con­
clusion on that point. Assuming the situation is such as Laskin, J., says, 
it cannot be improper for me to adhere to what was my dissenting view, 
when a majority o f those who did not agree with it in respect o f a partic­
ular section of the Indian A c t , R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, now adopt it for the 
main body of this important statute.
What, then does the Lavell-Bedard decision offer? It presents, 
for those who have examined the case in search of decisive law, 
a judicial smorgasbord composed of the following delicacies: (1) a 
majority judgment in Drybones based upon an earlier dissenting 
judgment which was repudiated by its author in the Drybones 
case, (2) a majority in Lavell-Bedard based upon a dissenting 
judgment in Drybones which was almost repudiated by its author 
in the Lavell-Bedard cases; (3) a majority judgment in Drybones
13 Ibid.. at p. 499.
14 Ibid.. at pp. 500-501.
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which was unanimously affirmed in Lavell-Bedard; (4) a majority 
judgment delivered by Ritchie J. in Lavell-Bedard which contra­
dicts the majority judgment delivered by that same judge in the 
earlier Drybones case; (5) a majority of the Court in the Lavell- 
Bedard cases in disagreement with the rationale for the majority 
judgment in those cases; and (6) strong dissenting judgments in 
both situations.
Note, however, that no solutions to the problems created by 
the conflict between the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Indian 
Act have been offered to compliment the brandy, the cigars and 
retirement to the library at the end of the repast. One is still no 
closer to a firm decision as to whether the Bill of Rights is merely 
a canon of construction or can be applied to legislation resulting 
from the power over “Indians and lands reserved for Indians” 
vested in the federal authority by s. 91 (24) of The British North 
America Act, 1867. Even the more general questions relating to 
the interpretation of the phrase “equality before the law” as it 
appears in s. 1(b) of the Bill of Rights15 and the interpretation 
of the word “discrimination” as it appears in s. 1 of the Bill of 
Rights16 have yet to be answered.
Such answers await future decisions, but, unfortunately, these 
decisions will have to grapple with the confused state of the law 
resulting from the judgments in the Drybones and the Lavell- 
Bedard cases. Having read these judgments, one cannot help 
but agree with Abbott J. who, at the conclusion of his short judg­
ment in the Lavell-Bedard cases, stated that:17
of one thing I am certain the Bill will continue to supply ample grist
to the judicial mills for som e time to com e.
Also, one cannot help but add to his prediction by stating that 
future decisions in this area of the law will bear a uniqueness of 
character which will have been created by the necessity of having 
to dodge and cope with those opinions on the subject which have 
come before.
tDonald J. Fleming
15 Supra, footnote 5.
16 Supra, footnote 5.
17 Supra, footnote 12. at p. 484.
t  The author is currently a second year Law student at U.N.B.
